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contracts, as these provisions tend to deprive the bankruptcy estate of valuable interests 
necessary to restore the debtor’s financial solvency.5   
            A Washington District Court, in In re Eustler, upheld this longstanding history of finding 
ipso facto contract provisions unenforceable.6  In Eustler, the district court found shareholders of 
a corporation were not entitled to relief from the automatic stay to exercise their contractual right 
to buy back a debtor’s shares.7  This is because the court found the shareholder’s agreement, 
which was dependent on the debtor’s financial condition, unenforceable.8    
            This memorandum discusses the rationale behind the prohibition against terminating 
equitable interests when debtors file for bankruptcy in three parts.  Part I describes ipso facto 
provisions. Part II focuses on the courts’ interpretations of ipso facto provisions and when 
contract provisions contingent on a debtor’s financial state may be enforced.  Part III examines 
the consequences of ipso facto provisions.  
I.  Ipso Facto Provisions Terminate a Debtor’s Interest upon Bankruptcy Filing 
            Ipso facto provisions are contract clauses that terminate, eliminate, limit, or otherwise 
modify a debtor’s interest under a contract that existed at the commencement of a bankruptcy, on 
the sole basis that the debtor filed for bankruptcy.9  Section 365(e)(1)(A) provides:  
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or 
in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not 
be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease 
may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the 
case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned on -   
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case.10
                                                
5 In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 422 B.R. 407, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Yates Dev., Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 253 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); In re Cole, 226 B.R. 647, 652 (9th Cir. 1998).   
6 In re Eustler, No. 15-00870-FPC13, 2017 WL 1157114, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. March 24, 2017).   
7 Id.   
8 Id. at *4 
9 In re Eustler at *4 n.7 (quoting Black Law’s Dictionary); In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 422 B.R. at 414.   
10 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(A).   
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While section 365(e)(1)(A) is limited to executory contracts and unexpired leases, the 
Bankruptcy Code extends the unenforceability of ipso facto clauses beyond contractual 
agreements.11  Section 541(c)(1)(B) provides that “an interest of the debtor in property becomes 
property of the estate notwithstanding any provision in an agreement . . . or applicable 
bankruptcy law . . . that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the 
debtor.”12  Section 541(c) was enacted to “invalidate restrictions on the transfer of property of 
the debtor” and ensure all of the debtor’s interest in property becomes part of the bankruptcy 
estate.13   
 In order for a provision to be considered ipso facto under the Bankruptcy Code, it must 
terminate or modify the debtor’s interest only because the debtor petitioned for 
bankruptcy.14  Although ipso facto provisions are drafted to automatically place a debtor in 
default at the filing of bankruptcy, such action cannot be compelled.15  A creditor cannot force a 
debtor into default on the mere existence of an ipso facto provision.16  Sections 365(e)(1)(A) and 
541(c)(1)(B) generally render provisions that terminate or modify a debtor’s interest in the event 
of bankruptcy invalid as a matter of law.17    
 
 
                                                
11 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B); In re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).  
12 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B).   
13 In re DBSI, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00025-RJB, 2015 WL 12683817, at *4 (D. Idaho July 24, 2015) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
95-595, at 368–69 (1977)).  
14 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(A); Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 611 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding a partnership 
agreement depriving bankrupt partner’s right to manage, without remaining partners’ approval, after filing for bankruptcy 
invalid by operation of law); In re Siegel Co., 51 B.R. 159, 164 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding insurance agreement 
cancelling debtor’s policy after debtor petitioned for bankruptcy unenforceable). 
15 In re FLYi, Inc., 377 B.R. 140, 147 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Auto Int’l Refrigeration, 275 B.R. 789, 811 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex.) aff’d in part, rev’d, & remanded in part, Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc., 307 B.R. 849 (N.D. Tex. 2002); In 
re Chateaugay Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7054(PKL), 1993 WL 159969, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 1993). 
16 In re Pak, 252 B.R. 215, 216 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000). 
17 In re DBSI Inc., 2015 WL 12683817, at *4 (stating "[t]he Bankruptcy Code generally disapproves of statutory and 
contractual provisions affecting the bankruptcy estate that are triggered by a bankruptcy"); In re FLYi, Inc., 377 B.R. at 
147.     
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439  
 
II.  Contract Provisions Contingent on a Debtor’s Solvency are Generally 
Unenforceable   
 
            In most circumstances, ipso facto provisions are held unenforceable in an effort to protect 
the debtor’s financial stability.18  However, not all bankruptcy clauses are 
unenforceable.19  Enforcement of provisions contingent on a debtor’s financial state may depend 
on the possible occurrence of non-bankruptcy events, the nature of the underlying contract, or the 
actions of a trustee.20   
            A. Ipso Facto Provisions Deprive Debtors of Valuable Assets 
            There is a strong presumption against the enforcement of ipso facto provisions.21  The 
Bankruptcy Code and the courts expect a bankruptcy estate to extend as far reaching as possible, 
to encompass all of a debtor’s assets, without losing its value due to restrictive contract 
provisions.22  Consequently, courts are reluctant to enforce ipso facto provisions for several 
reasons.  First, these provisions tend to deprive the bankruptcy estate of valuable assets necessary 
to restore the debtor’s financial solvency.23  A debtor’s interests under a contract are often the 
debtor’s only significant remaining assets and, thus, are necessary to reorganize.24  Taking these 
assets from the debtor because of bankruptcy “hampers [these] rehabilitation 
efforts.”25  Enforcing these clauses prevents the debtor’s ability to reorganize, “frustrate[ing]” the 
policy behind the Bankruptcy Code, persuading courts to reject ipso facto provisions.26  Thus, 
                                                
18 In re Eustler, No. 15-00870-FPC13, 2017 WL 1157114, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. March 24, 2017); In re Yates Dev., 
Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); Summit Inv., 69 F.3d at 610; In re Nemko, Inc., 163 B.R. 927, 935 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Lafayette Radio Elec. Corp., 7 B.R. 189, 192 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).   
19 In re Auto, 275 B.R. at 811; In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 257; In re Schweitzer, 19 B.R. 860, 867 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).  
20 In re Auto, 275 B.R. at 811; In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 257; In re Bell, 15 B.R. 859, 860 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
21 In re Lafayette, 7 B.R. at 192.  
22 In re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000). 
23 In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 253. 
24 In re Nemko, Inc., 163 B.R. 927, 935 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); Summit Inv., 69 F.3d at 610.  
25 Id.  
26 Queens Boulevard Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 1974).   
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contract clauses contingent on a debtor’s financial solvency are generally unenforceable as it 
impedes on the debtor’s benefit of starting fresh after filing for bankruptcy.27   
In addition, retaining interests may be necessary to ensure bankruptcy payment 
plans.28  For example, in Eustler, a company formed an agreement that included a clause creating 
an option for shareholders to purchase shares in the company from a shareholder that filed for 
bankruptcy.29  Upon one shareholder’s filing of bankruptcy, the non-bankrupt shareholders 
attempted to exercise the option.30  If the court approved the non-bankrupt shareholders’ option 
of purchasing the debtor’s shares, the non-bankrupt shareholders would become majority owners 
of the company, putting the debtor’s employment at risk.31  The court denied the petition to 
exercise the option, emphasizing the fact the debtor’s continued employment and income was 
essential for him to make payments according to his Chapter 13 plan.32   
            B. Certain Contract Provisions Terminating a Debtor’s Interest May Still be Enforced  
            Pursuant to section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, executory contracts and unexpired 
leases cannot be modified or terminated on the sole basis that a debtor filed for bankruptcy.33  
While this section of the Bankruptcy Code is strictly applied, it is subject to exceptions.34  A 
contract provision that alters a debtor’s interest will be enforced if the interest is altered for a 
reason other than bankruptcy.35  An ipso facto provision may similarly be enforced if a loan was 
made for the debtor’s benefit.36   
                                                
27 In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 152 (D. Del. 2012). 
28 In re Eustler, No. 15-00870-FPC13, 2017 WL 1157114, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. March 24, 2017). 
29 Id. at *1.   
30 Id. 
31 Id. at *4.   
32 Id.          
33 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1).   
34 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B) (2012); Mims v. Fid. Funding, Inc., 307 B.R. 849, 858 (N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Yates Dev., 
Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 257 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999). 
35 In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 257. 
36 Mims, 307 B.R. at 858.  
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            A contract provision or unexpired lease that terminates or modifies a debtor’s right under 
the contract for non-bankrupt reasons will not receive section 365(e)(1)(A)’s protection.37  Even 
if the debtor’s rights are altered because of bankruptcy, so long as the rights could have been 
altered by some other reason unrelated to bankruptcy, the provision is not considered ipso 
facto.38   
            Moreover, an ipso facto provision may be enforced if it is limited by section 
365(e)(2)(B).39  Section 365(e)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
(2)  Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or 
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if –  
(B)  such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing 
or 
financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue security 
of the debtor.40  
 
Hence, a contract or unexpired lease will be enforceable "if [the] contract is a [] loan or 
[extension of] other debt financing . . . for the benefit of the debtor or to issue security of the 
debtor."41  Pursuant to section 365(e)(2)(B), a debtor’s right under a contract may be terminated 
or modified if the debtor is provided a loan secured by a debt and subsequently files for 
bankruptcy.42  Enforcing a loan agreement is meant to protect secured creditors.43  Consequently, 
an ipso facto provision will be enforced where a loan is made for the debtor’s benefit.44   
    
 
                                                
37 In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 253.  
38 In re Yates, 241 B.R. at 253 (explaining an increased purchase price pursuant to an agreement to buy land was not ipso 
facto and thus enforceable because such clause was not automatically modified on the sole basis of the debtor bankruptcy 
petition). 
39 Mims, 307 B.R. at 858. 
40 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B).   
41 Mims, 307 B.R. at 858 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B)).   
42 Id. (finding debtor’s obligations automatically accelerated upon bankruptcy pursuant to a loan agreement).  
43 See In re Schweitzer, 19 B.R. 860, 868 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (discussing a balance between secured creditors’ rights 
pursuant to security agreements and debtors’ rights pursuant to ipso facto provisions).   
44 Mims, 307 B.R. at 858.      
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C.  A Trustee’s Action May Allow Enforceability of Ipso Facto Provisions  
            Section 541(c)(1)(B) is intended to invalidate restrictive contract provisions that attempt 
to terminate property interests merely because of a debtor’s insolvency, beyond such restrictions 
found only in executory contracts or unexpired leases.45  Similar to section 365(e)(1)(A), section 
541(c)(1)(B) should be strictly construed.46  Accordingly, courts invalidate such restrictive 
contract provisions that affect a debtor’s interest in property when facing bankruptcy, "in most, if 
not all," cases.47   
            Section 541(c)(1)(B)’s effectiveness, however, depends on actions taken by the trustee of 
the bankruptcy estate.48  A debtor’s property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate by 
operation of law once a bankruptcy is filed.49  Though property automatically becomes part of 
the bankruptcy estate, a trustee of the estate has the power to abandon that property.50  If a trustee 
utilizes the power of abandonment and does not seek to retain or redeem the property, then the 
abandoned property is no longer protected by section 541(c)(1)(B).51  An ipso facto provision 
may be enforced against property that is subject to the contractual provision and abandoned by 
the trustee.52  Similar to section 365(e)(2)(B), courts are concerned with protecting the interests 
of secured creditors.53  
 
                                                
45 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B); In re DBSI, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00025-RJB, 2015 WL 12683817, at *4 (D. Idaho July 24, 
2015); In re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).   
46 See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 153 (D. Del. 2012). 
47 In re DBSI, 2015 WL 12683817, at *4; In re W.R. Grace, 475 B.R. at 153 (maintaining a longstanding precedent of 
depicting ipso facto clauses as “invalid in all types of contracts, without limitation”).   
48 In re Bell, 15 B.R. 859, 860 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
49 11 U.S.C. § 541(c); In re Bell, 15 B.R. at 861. 
50 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012) ("the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is 
of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.").   
51 In re Bell, 15 B.R. at 861–862 (discussing trustee’s abandonment of debtor’s van used as collateral). 
52 Id. (explaining creditor’s right to reclaim debtor’s abandoned van pursuant to their loan agreement). 
53 See In re Schweitzer, 19 B.R. 860, 868 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (balancing "secured creditors loss of the debtor’s 
personal liability on the obligation . . . against the reality that enforcing the provisions will not necessarily deprive the 
debtor of his vehicle").  
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III.   The Severability of Ipso Facto Provisions   
            It is unlikely an entire contract will be unenforceable because it contains an ipso facto 
provision.  When examining issues regarding ipso facto provisions, courts generally look only to 
the provision in question rather than the contract as a whole.54  While there is strong policy 
against enforcement of ipso facto provisions, there also exists a sound policy of maintaining 
parties’ rights to freedom of contract.55  Due to these competing policies, courts typically sever 
the ipso facto provision from the remainder of the contract.56    
IV.  Conclusion  
            The enforceability of ipso facto provisions against a debtor after filing a petition for 
protection under the Bankruptcy Code is far and few in between.  In most circumstances, 
contract provisions that are contingent on a debtor’s financial state are invalidated by operation 
of law; although courts have established a few exceptions.57  Still, in bankruptcy cases, most ipso 
facto provisions will be held ineffective as courts are concerned with restoring a debtor’s 
financial stability.58  Acknowledging and respecting the policy of maintaining the right to 
freedom of contract, when holding an ipso facto provision unenforceable courts will typically 
sever the ipso facto provision from the subject agreement, leaving the remaining portion of the 
agreement otherwise unaffected.  
 
 
                                                
54 In re Warner, 480 B.R. 641, 655 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2012); Summit Inv., 69 F.3d at 614.  
55 Tree Top Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1211 (E.D. Wash. 2017). 
56 See e.g., In re Warner, 480 B.R. at 655 (court isolated a provision in an operating agreement that dissolved a company 
upon a debtor’s petition for bankruptcy from the rest of the contract); Summit, 69 F.3d at 614 (clause in agreement 
modifying debtor’s interest in a partnership upon filing for bankruptcy held ineffective, without invalidating the entire 
partnership agreement).    
57 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1)(A), 541(c)(1)(B); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 475 B.R. 34, 153 (D. Del. 2012); Mims v. Fid. 
Funding, Inc., 307 B.R. 849, 858 (N.D. Tex. 2002); In re Yates Dev., Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); In 
re Bell, 15 B.R. 859, 861–862 (E.D. Mich. 1981).   
58 Summit, 69 F.3d at 610; Blum, 503 F.2d at 205. 
